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Introduction
Chief executive ofﬁcer compensation is a subject about which much has been written.
Recently, researchers proposed that the factors that inﬂuence executive compensation
differ across industries. For example, Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) ﬁnd
that managers of companies which compete in imperfectly competitive markets may be
rewarded or penalized for higher sales. Reitman (1993) reports that stock options often
prevent managers from becoming overly aggressive sellers when they compete by
selecting output levels. The agency relationship between owners and managers implies
that agreements are necessary to insure that the best interests of stockholders are
maintained. The provisions of compensation arrangements can do much to minimize the
agency or monitoring costs that would otherwise be borne by owners.
The principal-agent literature ﬁnds that performance-contingent contracts are useful
for aligning the incentives of managers and owners. When principals (owners) are unable
to effectively monitor agents (managers), tying compensation to observable signals of the
manager’s effort will help solve the principal-agent problem.1 Baumol (1959) notes the
separation of ownership from management and the positive correlation between the scale
of operations and executive compensation. Identiﬁcation of this relationship led Baumol
to suggest that managers seek to maximize sales and, thereby, increase their personal
income and perks. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the separation of atomistic
owners (stockholders) and control (managers) creates an environment in which
executives are largely free to indulge their own preferences. The contractual relationship
between owners and managers is an example of the principal-agent problem. Owners
cannot accurately monitor the effort and effectiveness of managers, whose decisions
affect shareholder wealth.2
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Abstract. Principal-agent literature ﬁnds that manager and owner incentives can be aligned
with performance contingent contracts. We investigate the compensation of Real Estate
Investment Trust (REIT) industry executives. The competitive nature of mortgage and
equity markets, in conjunction with the corporate tax exemption available when REITs
distribute most of their earnings as dividends, is likely to inﬂuence the compensation of
REIT managers. Executive compensation is modelled as a function of revenues and
unexpected proﬁt. After transforming the model to reduce collinearity and hetero-
skedasticity, we ﬁnd compensation to be generally positively related to revenue. We also
ﬁnd unexpected proﬁt to be generally insigniﬁcantly related to compensation, but positively
related in those cases where it is signiﬁcant.While research in this area has shown that an owner’s best response is contingent
payment contracting based on some performance measure (Harris and Raviv, 1979;
Holmstrom, 1979), no research clearly states which is the most appropriate indicator of
management performance. This void has left empirical analysts searching for relevant
indicators. In this study, we focus on a particular industry, Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), and analyze the relationship between executive compensation and certain
performance measures. Baumol suggests sales and proﬁts.
REITs have characteristics that differentiate them from industrial and ﬁnancial
service industries. One distinguishing feature is their exemption from corporate income
tax. To qualify for this tax break, at least 95% of earnings must be distributed as
dividends. Maris and Elayan (1990) show that REITs exhibit a strong leverage clientele
effect.3
Examination of REIT executive compensation is particularly interesting because of the
differences in earnings performance within this industry (Howe and Shilling, 1990) and
tax structure mentioned above, which effectively requires REIT managers to distribute
most corporate earnings. Under these conditions, owners seeking to maximize (distri-
buted) proﬁts for any given level of sales should reward managers for their efforts directed
toward cost reduction. Similarly, if costs per dollar of sales are relatively invariant to the
efforts of managers, (distributed) proﬁts will increase as the level of sales increases. It is
not clear which of these actions, cost-cutting efforts or sales growth, will have the largest
impact on proﬁts. While there is no direct evidence of the effects of different managerial
styles on ﬁnancial performance among REITs, the qualiﬁcations of their consultants are
shown to affect ﬁnancial performance (Howe and Shilling, 1990). For these reasons, we
choose to analyze the inﬂuence of sales and the deviation of proﬁts from the level
predicted by ﬁrm sales on executive compensation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews previous
literature on this topic. The empirical model and regression models are discussed in the
third section. The data are described in section four. The results are found in section ﬁve
with conclusions presented in section six.
Summary of Previous Research
The analytical results of Chief Executive Ofﬁcer (CEO) compensation have varied
widely. In an early study, McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (1962) test the sales maximization
hypothesis proposed by Baumol (1959). They ﬁnd evidence in a group of industrial ﬁrms
that supports Baumol’s hypothesis that sales results are often reﬂected in the level of
executive compensation. In contrast, Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) ﬁnd that CEO
compensation has a signiﬁcant relationship with ﬁrm proﬁts, but no such relationship
with sales. Others have analyzed the relationship between executive compensation and
sales, proﬁts, growth rates of sales and proﬁts, ﬁrm stock price performance and stock
performance relative to industry and market-wide measures of stock performance, return
on assets, return on equity, and other measures of ﬁrm performance.
Generally, studies of the relationship between corporate ﬁnancial performance and
executive compensation have focused on industrial ﬁrms or companies from many
industries. Industry-speciﬁc analyses of these relationships are less common. Ely (1991)
ﬁnds little evidence of industry differences in explicit compensation plans. However, she
does ﬁnd signiﬁcant empirical evidence of inter-industry differences in the pay-
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between compensation and performance measures is explained by differences in
production environments and the way these environments are reﬂected in accounting
variables.’’ Agrawal, Makhija and Mandelker (1991) examine the pay-performance
relationship for managers of electric and gas utilities. Their results are unique in that
changes in ﬁrm performance have signiﬁcant effects on executive compensation for
managers of regulated utilities. These researchers highlight inter-industry differences in
the incentives created by compensation contracts.
Ciscel and Carroll (1980) ﬁnd that resources and productive efﬁciency directly
inﬂuence executive compensation. Bentson (1985), Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and
Murphy (1985) report that a manager’s total compensation is positively related to both
stock prices and sales. Jensen and Murphy (1990) examine more than 1,000 companies
and ﬁnd that over the last ﬁfty years the dependence of pay on ﬁrm performance has
decreased to the point that compensation no longer solves the agency problem.4
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) ﬁnd that managers are rewarded when stock returns exceed
those of both competing ﬁrms and the overall market. Golz (1993) studies executive
compensation in the REIT industry. Golz suggests that investment analysts are
particularly interested in the compensation packages offered to REIT managers. Our
examination of REIT proxy statements did not reveal explicit incentive structures or
common goals for REIT managers. This absence leads us to analyze compensation
empirically.
An Empirical Model of Compensation
Following the precedent set by Ely (1991) and Agrawal et al. (1991), we focus on a
single industry, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), and describe the relationship
between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance, measured as proﬁts and sales.
This data set includes sales, net income and compensation data for as many as ﬁve
management positions. We obtain this information from a survey, thus yielding a cross-
sectional data set.
Cross-sectional analysis has both advantages and disadvantages. We are most
interested in the enduring characteristics of compensation contracts and not in the
inﬂuence of short-lived responses. Therefore, we include a representative cross-section of
the industry. Kuh (1963) notes that ‘‘cross-sections typically will reﬂect long run
adjustments whereas annual time series will tend to reﬂect shorter run reactions’’ (p. 182).
This argument rests on the assumption that ﬁrms typically operate in equilibrium. Based
on this assumption, our cross-sectional study should describe the equilibrium relation-
ship between executive compensation, sales and proﬁts in the REIT industry.
While cross-sectional data should reveal the equilibrium condition of compensation
contracts, it is not without some difﬁculty that this information may be extracted from
the data. The ﬁrst problem encountered concerns the high degree of collinearity between
sales and proﬁts. If we regress executive compensation against a constant, sales and
proﬁts, multicollinearity between these measures will not bias our estimates of the slope
coefﬁcients; however, these estimates will be inefﬁcient.5 Given this inefﬁciency, we expect
the standard errors of our coefﬁcient estimates to be inﬂated, which reduces the measured
signiﬁcance of the estimates.
COMPENSATION OF REIT MANAGERS 265Baumol (1959) suggests that executives are rewarded for sales only after some
minimum proﬁt level has been achieved. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) ﬁnd evidence that
managers are rewarded for ﬁrm stock price performance relative to that of other ﬁrms.
The use of cross-sectional data and the method employed by Ciscel and Carroll (1980)
allows separation of the collinearity between proﬁts and sales and enables us to
determine the inﬂuence of proﬁts above or below an amount suggested by the ﬁrm’s sales
volume.
The use of accounting performance measures establishes the dependency between
observed proﬁts and the level of sales. Measured proﬁt is the difference between sales
revenue and costs and is, therefore, determined after sales are made. Thus, we ﬁrst
estimate proﬁts as a function of an intercept and ﬁrm sales. This regression conﬁrms our
conjecture that sales and proﬁts are collinear.6
As noted by Ciscel and Carroll (1980), the multicollinearity between sales and proﬁts
reduces the efﬁciency of the OLS estimator. To control for multicollinearity, we ﬁrst
estimate the following model for both the entire sample and then separately for each
subgroup:7
Net Income5a1b1(TR)1e , (1)
where Net income and TR are the net income and total revenue of each ﬁrm, respec-
tively.8,9 The coefﬁcient estimates from (1) are then used to calculate the expected proﬁts
of each ﬁrm in the sample, given the level of sales. We then use the following equation to
calculate the unexpected proﬁt for each ﬁrm:
UNEXPROFIT5Net Income2(a1b1(TR) . (2)




MGRPAY is the total dollar compensation for a manager (estimated
separately for CEO, President, and so forth as classiﬁed
above),
UNEXPROFIT is the unexpected proﬁt level (as deﬁned in (2) above) of the
manager’s ﬁrm,
TR is the total revenue of the manager’s ﬁrm,
a is the intercept term,
b’s are the estimated coefﬁcient terms, and
e is the error term.10
As we discuss below, compensation and revenues appear to be positively correlated in
several cases (as noted in Note 8). Following the precedent set by Lewellen and
Huntsman (1970), we transform (3) by dividing all variables, including the intercept, by
Book Value of Total Assets to obtain:
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In effect, with this speciﬁcation we estimate the compensation per dollar of assets
managed as a function of unexpected proﬁts and revenues per dollar of assets. The results
of the models are discussed in section ﬁve.
Sample Selection
This study addresses the compensation of executives in the Real Estate Investment
Trust (REIT) industry. These ﬁrms are identiﬁed using several databases that contain
Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) code information. We include in our sample
those ﬁrms with the SIC code 6798. The databases that were searched for this
information include Standard and Poor’s Compustat, including the Annual, Over the
Counter, and Research ﬁles (eighty-eight REITs); The Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database (twenty-six REITs); and the Compact Disclosure database (ﬁve
REITs). The Media General Financial database classiﬁcation code for REITs is 432, and
there are 110 ﬁrms in this category.
In addition to these computerized databases, additional REITs were identiﬁed through
use of the 1992 edition of the Million Dollar Directory. This reference contains the names
and addresses of large American ﬁrms in all industries. Among the Real Estate
Investment Trust companies, sixty-four listed in the directory are publicly traded and,
therefore, qualify for inclusion in this study group. 
Several recent articles that examine REITs report the names of the sample ﬁrms in an
appendix. These studies include Myers and Webb (1993), who examine eighty-one
companies, and Chan, Hendershott and Sanders (1990), who list the thirty equity REITs
of their study.
We identiﬁed and contacted a total of 144 separate ﬁrms in the REIT industry. We then
requested that they furnish the 1992 ﬁscal year information about ﬁrm performance and
executive compensation. This information is usually contained in Annual Financial
Reports and proxy statements. Requests for this information were sent to the Share-
holders Relations Department of the ﬁrms for which addresses were available in the 1992
edition of the Million Dollar Directory. Ten requests were returned because of lack of
sufﬁcient address.
We received 108 responses to our requests for information. Annual reports were
inspected to determine whether the respondent ﬁrms were indeed Real Estate Investment
Trusts. Those that we identiﬁed as being mostly involved in another line of business were
removed from the sample. Proxy statements were not sent by twenty-nine ﬁrms and
twenty-two proxies did not include sufﬁcient compensation information to justify
inclusion in the study group. The ﬁfty-four ﬁrms in the sample are listed in the Appendix.
Following the work of Wang, Chan and Gao (1992), we begin by dividing the REITs
into one of three groups, depending on whether they are engaged in equity, mortgage or
both lines of business. This separation reﬂects inherent differences in the operating
environments between mortgage writing and property ownership REITs. During the
process of data collection, it became apparent that there were two distinct categories of
the primary areas of operation of the Real Estate Investment Trusts. These are ﬁrms that
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COMPENSATION OF REIT MANAGERS 267we classify as ‘‘commercial’’ or ‘‘medical’’ depending upon whether the ﬁrm is primarily
involved in the operation of commercial or industrial properties, or hospitals and other
related medical facilities. We believe that additional insight about the compensation
structures of REIT managers can be obtained by including these dimensions in our
analyses.
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Exhibit 1
REIT Company and Compensation Descriptive Statistics*
Standard Minimum Maximum
N Mean Deviation Value Value
Panel A—Total Assets by Company Types
All Firms 54 485.26 1,072.79 2.41 7,229.61
Equity 36 222.83 168.63 17.57 603.81
Mortgage 10 1,552.28 2,240.03 2.41 7,229.61
Both E/M 8 332.42 335.92 41.55 1,094.94
Panel B—Total Revenue by Company Types
All Firms 54 52.27 82.34 .11 504.05
Equity 36 34.39 30.37 .40 100.20
Mortgage 10 127.27 165.22 .11 504.45
Both E/M 8 39.01 41.70 .74 132.39
Standard
N Mean Deviation
Panel C—Executive Compensation by Ofﬁce and Company Type
CEO All Firms 13 461.7 536.3
Equity 9 393.3 191.9
Mortgage 3 114.2 40.0
Both E/M 1 2,120.0 —
President All Firms 33 294.2 200.6
Equity 20 274.0 136.1
Mortgage 7 328.7 365.2
Both E/M 6 321.3 151.8
VP/Finance All Firms 26 172.2 65.0 
Equity 18 175.8 73.5
Mortgage 3 182.1 19.6
Both E/M 5 153.4 51.5
VP/Legal All Firms 17 140.7 44.6
Equity 14 143.8 48.7
Mortgage 1 128.8 —
Both E/M 2 124.3 8.1
VP/Other All Firms 20 133.7 44.5
Equity 15 133.5 48.4
Mortgage 3 143.8 43.9
Both E/M 2 120.1 14.0
Exec All Firms 39 356.0 354.2
Equity 25 303.6 162.8
Mortgage 8 304.7 345.3
Both E/M 6 643.0 736.5
*Total Revenue and Total Assets are in millions of dollars. Executive Compensation, Panel C, is in
thousands of dollars.The REITs responding to the survey are distributed as follows: equity (thirty-six
observations), mortgage (ten), and both (eight). Descriptive statistics for the sample and
subgroups are found in Exhibits 1 and 4. The mean Total Assets and Revenues of the
sample are $485M and $52M, respectively. Mean Total Assets of the equity, mortgage,
and both subgroups are $223M, $1,552M, and $332M, respectively. Mean Total
Revenues are $34M for equity, $127M for mortgage, and $39M for both. Mean Total
Assets and Total Revenues are $505M and $53M for commercial REITs, $454M and
$62M for medical REITs, and $460M and $47M for mixed REITs. It is interesting to note
that the mean Total Assets of medical REITs are approximately 10% smaller than
commercial REITs, while medical REITs have mean Total Revenues that are almost 20%
higher than their commercial REIT counterparts.
As can be seen in Exhibit 1, Panel C, managers of REITs are divided into five
categories: CEO, President, Vice President–Finance, Vice President–Legal, and Vice
President–Other. Another category, Exec, is the CEO’s salary or, if this is not available,
the President’s salary. These categories are used to identify possible differences in
incentives for each of these managerial positions. The mean compensation for the entire
sample decreases monotonically from $462,000 for CEOs to $134,000 for VP–Other.11
Results
Exhibit 2 presents the results from the model presented in (3) above.12 Among all ﬁrms,
unexpected proﬁt is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with Exec compensation for all
ﬁrms and for the equity group. The total revenue coefﬁcient estimates are positive and
signiﬁcant for the President, one Vice-President, and Exec when all ﬁrms are grouped
together. The estimates of the total revenue coefﬁcient for President and Exec of the
equity and mortgage REITs and the CEO of equity REITs are also positive and
signiﬁcant.
It is interesting to note that in only three of seventeen regressions are estimates of the
unexpected proﬁt coefﬁcient statistically signiﬁcant (95% level of conﬁdence). To review,
our unexpected proﬁt term measures the deviation from a ‘‘normal’’ or expected level of
proﬁt for a given level of sales. While we do not attempt to formally test this hypothesis,
our results are consistent with the theory that managers are free to pursue their own goals
once a certain level of proﬁt has been achieved, as suggested by Baumol (1959).
A comparison of the results reported in Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3 highlights the
inﬂuence of the econometric speciﬁcation on the results. Note that in Exhibit 2, the
reported coefﬁcient estimates and their (in)signiﬁcance indicate no consistent relationship
between either of the measures of ﬁrm performance included in the model. As discussed
above, heteroskedasticity results in a decrease in the efﬁciency of coefﬁcient estimates, in
turn reducing their measured signiﬁcance. We suspect that heteroskedasticity is related to
differences in the size of ﬁrms included in the data set; therefore, we deﬂate each variable
included in the regression equation by a proxy for ﬁrm size, total asset value.13
In general, we ﬁnd that managers are rewarded for increases in ﬁrm sales, while proﬁts
(costs) that are above or below expected proﬁts (costs) for a given level of sales have little
impact on executive pay. It is not clear whether managers are unable to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence costs, or whether the greatest impact of managerial actions on distributed
proﬁts is through his/her inﬂuence on sales. If the REIT industry is competitive and all
ﬁrms have access to the same production technology, the proﬁt earned by each ﬁrm will
COMPENSATION OF REIT MANAGERS 269represent a normal return to capital and the risk characteristics of the ﬁrm and industry.
Baumol (1959) suggests that as the size of operations is increased, a ﬁrm is able to beneﬁt
from improved access to credit markets and customer/lender perceptions. If true,
increases in the size of the ﬁrm will indirectly lower the cost of production. Under either
of these conditions, proﬁt distributions to REIT owners should increase as the size of the
REIT’s asset portfolio increases.14
While we do not attempt to develop a theory of REIT manager compensation, our
results are consistent with those predicted by Baumol, or the characterization of a
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Exhibit 2
REIT Executive Compensation Regression Results
(MGRPAY) =a + b1(UNEXPROFIT) + b2(TR) + e
a b1 b2 R2
Panel A—All Firms
Managerial CEO† (N513) 115.8K .0169 .0061 .769
Position President† (N533) 202.0K* 2.0004 .0017* .553
VP-Finance (N526) 164.6K* .0004 .0001 .022
VP-Legal (N517) 126.8K* 2.0012 .0004 .148
VP-Other (N520) 124.4K* 2.0011 .0002* .279
Exec† (N539) 239.7K* .0114* .0019* .478
Panel B—Equity REITs
Managerial CEO† (N59) 231.9K* .0038 .0036* .747
Position President† (N520) 180.7K* .0053 .0023* .346
VP-Finance (N518) 127.1K* .0022 .0073 .158
VP-Legal (N514) 119.5K* 2.0009 .0006 .182
VP-Other (N515) 100.7K* .0012 .0007 .328
Exec† (N525) 175.0K* .0050* .0030* .539
Panel C—Mortgage REITs
Managerial CEO (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
Position President† (N57) 83.9K 2.0052 .0021* .947
VP-Finance (N53)     Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Legal (N51)        Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Other (N53)        Insufﬁcient Data
Exec† (N58) 92.4K 2.0051 .0021* .943
Panel D—Both Equity and Mortgage REITs
Managerial CEO (N51) Insufﬁcient Data
Position President (N56) 355.9K .0006 5.0009 .061
VP-Finance (N55) 192.5K* .0019 2.0012 .601
VP-Legal (N52)        Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Other (N52)        Insufﬁcient Data
Exec† (N56) 96.9K .0043 .0126 .874
†signiﬁes that the regression is signiﬁcant at the a 5.05 level or better
*signiﬁes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the a 5.05 level or bettercompetitive market, given above. In either case, the proﬁts distributed to REIT owners
will increase as the size of the ﬁrm increases, which may explain the observed positive
correlation between ﬁrm sales and manager compensation.
We also separate the data into commercial, medical, or ‘‘mixed’’ REITs and repeat the
empirical analysis. The ‘‘mixed’’ category contains those ﬁrms that are substantially
involved in both medical and commercial operations. Exhibits 4 through 6 report the
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Exhibit 3
REIT Executive Compensation Regression Results
BASE (4)
b1 b2 b3 R2
Panel A—All Firms
Managerial CEO† (N513) 2.0138 .0103* 129.6K* .991
Position President† (N533) .0113* .0035* 149.5K* .929
VP-Finance† (N526) 2.0001 2.0013* 212.8K* .970
VP-Legal† (N517) 2.0008 .0011* 91.1K* .939
VP-Other† (N520) 2.0014 .0004* 92.1K* .959
Exec† (N539) .0129* .0055* 164.4K* .976
Panel B—Equity REITs
Managerial CEO† (N59) .0044 .0015 359.7K* .972
Position President† (N520) .0068 .0034 145.2K* .841
VP-Finance† (N518) 2.0011 2.0001 175.4K* .961
VP-Legal† (N514) 2.0007 .0011 89.5K* .935
VP-Other† (N515) 2.0011 .0008 86.7K* .951
Exec† (N525) 2.0033 .0046 183.7K* .750
Panel C—Mortgage REITs
Managerial CEO (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
Position President† (N57) 2.0125 .0064 237.9K .996
VP-Finance (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Legal (N51) Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Other (N153) Insufﬁcient Data
Exec† (N58) .0138* .0037 168.3K* .999
Panel D—Both Equity and Mortgage REITs
Managerial CEO (N51) Insufﬁcient Data
Position President† (N56) 2.0076 .0023 233.0K* .915
VP-Finance† (N55) 2.0023 .0026 233.0K* .998
VP-Legal (N52) Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Other (N52) Insufﬁcient Data
Exec (N56) 2.0025 .0058 219.6K* .883
†signiﬁes that the regression is signiﬁcant at the a 5.05 level or better
*signiﬁes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the a 5.05 level or better
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Exhibit 4
REIT Company and Compensation Descriptive Statistics*
Standard Minimum Maximum
N Mean Deviation Value Value
Panel A—Total Assets by Company Types
All Firms 54 485.26 1,072.79 2.41 7,229.61
Commercial 31 505.46 1,314.02 2.41 7,229.61
Medical 7 453.69 324.21 117.26 1,094.94
Mixed 16 459.95 754.38 26.67 2,409.97
Panel B—Total Revenue by Company Types 
All Firms 54 52.27 82.34 .11 504.45
Commercial 31 52.80 97.32 .11 504.45
Medical 7 62.40 39.52 19.04 132.39
Mixed 16 46.82 65.60 .40 246.11
Standard
N Mean Deviation
Panel C—Executive Compensation by Ofﬁce and Company Type
CEO All Firms 13 461.7 536.3
Commercial 6 308.7 244.5
Medical 2 1,388.0 1,035.2
Mixed 5 274.9 112.3
President All Firms 33 294.2 200.6
Commercial 20 285.8 240.8
Medical 4 351.3 126.9
Mixed 9 287.4 124.4
VP/Finance All Firms 26 172.2 65.0
Commercial 12 179.4 79.4
Medical 5 164.7 73.1
Mixed 9 166.8 41.2
VP/Legal All Firms 17 140.7 44.6
Commercial 10 141.8 51.6
Medical 3 136.7 20.6
Mixed 4 140.8 47.8
VP/Other All Firms 20 133.7 44.5
Commercial 10 146.4 56.4
Medical 3 124.3 18.9
Mixed 7 110.6 28.6
Exec All Firms 39 356.0 354.2
Commercial 22 303.2 250.9
Medical 5 798.2 749.1
Mixed 12 268.5 79.6
*Total Revenue and Total Assets are in millions of dollars. Executive Compensation, Panel C, is in
thousands of dollars.results for these categories. The results are very similar to those for Exhibit 1 through
Exhibit 3, the obvious reason being that the vast majority of the ﬁrms are both
commercial and equity REITs as shown in the Appendix.
Summary and Conclusions
Many researchers have examined the incentives created by compensation contracts;
however, there has been relatively little research directed toward incentives in any
particular industry. Microeconomic theory implies that owners will be concerned with
maximizing ﬁrm proﬁts, while managers will be interested in maximizing their utility.
Results of some recent theoretical research suggests that incentives will vary across
industries, depending on market conditions. In this paper, we analyze the incentives
facing REIT managers. By focusing on a particular industry, we expect to be able to
avoid potential misspeciﬁcation problems resulting from the inappropriate pooling of
ﬁrms competing in diverse industries.
Earlier work in the area of compensation contracting has suggested that compensation
is directly related to ﬁrm size and proﬁtability. A ﬁrm’s sales revenue is an important
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Exhibit 5
REIT Executive Compensation Regression Results
(MGRPAY) =a + b1(UNEXPROFIT) + b2(TR) + e
a b1 b2 R2
Panel A—Commercial REITs
Managerial CEO†(N56) 96.3K .0190* .0044* .964
Position President† (N520) 184.0K* .0024 .0019* .774
VP-Finance (N512) 166.4K* .0016 .0001 .042
VP-Legal (N510) 102.6K* 2.0042 .0010* .519
VP-Other (N510) 130.3K* 2.0017 .0002 .262
Exec† (N522) 203.6K* .0057 .0019* .731
Panel B—Medical REITs
Managerial CEO (N52) Insufﬁcient Data
Position President (N54) 577.8K .0016 2.0031 .743
VP-Finance (N55) 153.2K .0009 .00001 .104
VP-Legal (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Other (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
Exec (N55) 2447.7K .0080 .0148 .816
Panel C—Mixed REITs
Managerial CEO (N55) 247.2K .0008 .0023 .090
Position President (N59) 307.5K* .0019 2.0005 .066
VP-Finance (N59) 182.0K* 2.0002 2.0003 .125
VP-Legal (N54) 45.3K .0112 2.0012 .747
VP-Other (N57) 120.0K* 2.0011 .0001 .139
Exec (N512) 272.1K* 2.0002 2.0001 .006
†signiﬁes that the regression is signiﬁcant at the a 5.05 level or better
*signiﬁes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the a 5.05 level or bettermeasure of the size of the ﬁrm, while net income is clearly a leading contender as a
measure of proﬁtability. Regardless of which potential accounting measure of proﬁts is
selected, we expect to ﬁnd a high degree of collinearity between sales and proﬁts. This
collinearity will reduce the efﬁciency of OLS estimates. To reduce the collinearity between
sales and proﬁts, we estimate the difference between observed proﬁts and the expected
proﬁt, given a ﬁrm’s sales revenue. Essentially, this unanticipated proﬁt term reﬂects a
manager’s effort and effectiveness in reducing costs.
In general, we ﬁnd that managers are rewarded for increases in ﬁrm sales, while proﬁts
(costs) that are above or below expected proﬁts (costs) for a given level of sales have little
impact on executive pay. It is not clear whether managers are unable to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence costs, or whether the greatest impact of a manager’s actions on distributed
proﬁts is through his/her inﬂuence on sales.
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Exhibit 6
REIT Executive Compensation Regression Results
BASE (4)
b1 b2 b3 R2
Panel a—Commercial REITs
Managerial CEO† (N56) .0192 .0028 175.4K* .999
Position President† (N520) .0086 .0037 127.8K* .934
VP-Finance† (N512) 2.0027 .0001 173.3K* .972
VP-Legal† (N510) 2.0040 .0015* 86.2K* .978
VP-Other† (N510) 2.0009 .0006 100.7K* .978
Exec† (N522) .0138* .0033 168.7K* .994
Panel B—Medical REITs
Managerial CEO (N52) Insufﬁcient Data
Position President (N54) .0030 2.0022 512.7K .988
VP-Finance (N55) .0010 .0014 64.1K .929
VP-Legal (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
VP-Other (N53) Insufﬁcient Data
Exec (N55) .0040 .0083 13.9K .889
Panel C—Both Commercial and Medical REITs
Managerial CEO† (2N255) .0058 2.0006 378.5K .973
Position President† (N59) .0098 .0014 191.5K* .955
VP-Finance† (N59) 2.0030 2.0023* 238.8K* .994
VP-Legal (N54) .0138 2.0033 66.8K .995
VP-Other† (N57) 2.0013 .0006 89.1K* .948
Exec† (N512) 2.0045 .0028 287.7K* .948
†signiﬁes that the regression is signiﬁcant at the a5.05 level or better
*signiﬁes that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the a5.05 level or better
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Appendix
‘‘Equity’’ Real Estate ‘‘Mortgage’’ Real Estate Both ‘‘Equity’’ and ‘‘Mortgage’’
Investment Trusts Investment Trusts Real Estate Investment Trusts
American Health(2) ASR Investment Banyan Mortgage
Banyan Short Te Banyan Hotel Inc. CV REIT
Bradley Real Estate BRT Realty Trust(1) Healthvest(2)
BRE Properties(1) Capstead HRE Properties
Burnham Paciﬁc Countrywide Cre(1) Meditrust(2)
Clevetrust Real Estate Dial REIT Mortgage & Realty
Cousins Property(1) Homeplex Mortgage(1) NHP Nationwide(2)
East Group Property(1) Real America Presidential Realty(1)
Eastover Corporation Resource Mortgage(1)



























Note: All ﬁrms are commercial unless identiﬁed as commercial and residential (1) or medical (2).Notes
1See for example work of Holmstrom (1979) and Harris and Raviv (1979).
2Owners do not monitor managers because monitoring is either not possible, or because any given
owner’s cost of monitoring exceeds the beneﬁt of doing so.
3The leverage clientele effect holds that there will be a bimodal distribution of capital structures,
completely unlevered or highly levered, within an industry. Investors in high (low) tax brackets will
prefer to hold shares of unlevered (levered) ﬁrms (see Kim, Lewellen and McConnell, 1979).
4Here, effort refers to the inﬂuence of all of a manager’s actions on the performance of the ﬁrm and
is more broadly deﬁned than a strict interpretation of ‘‘effort’’.
5A discussion of multicollinearity’s effect on regression estimates is beyond the scope of this article.
Interested readers should see Kmenta (1986), pp. 430–42.
6When we estimate proﬁts as a function of an intercept and ﬁrm sales for all ﬁrms in the sample, we
obtain the following results: F-value57.444 (signiﬁcant at the .01 level), Adjusted R25.1084,
a5$476,478 (t5.143), and b(sales)5.094 (t52.728 and signiﬁcant at the a5.01 level).
7The method used here follows Ciscel and Carroll (1980). It is suggested as a way to reduce
heteroskedasticity and simultaneous equation biases.
8Total revenue and net income are positively related, as expected, in all four regressions estimated.
The total revenue coefﬁcient and, thus, the model itself are signiﬁcant at the a5.05 level or better
for the entire sample and for the equity REITs subsample. The mortgage and both equity and
mortgage subgroups’ models are not signiﬁcant at the a5.05 level.
9The assumption of homoskedasticity for this regression cannot be rejected given a chi-square test
value of 3.9151 (alpha level5.1412) for the entire sample. Each subsample has insigniﬁcant chi-
square test values as well.
10The assumption of homoskedasticity across ﬁrms is not rejected for any executive position
classiﬁcation for the entire sample. The assumption is also not rejected for all positions in the three
subgroups (for which there are sufﬁcient data) except for President in the equity subgroup. The
conﬁdence level for hypothesis rejection is at the a5.05 level or better.
11The relatively high compensation of the CEOs of medical REITs (in Table 4) is noteworthy,
although the small sample size should be noted.
12We measure Total Revenue and UNEXPROFIT and compensation in actual dollars; therefore, an
UNEXPROFIT coefﬁcient estate of .0114 indicates compensation will change by 11.4 cents in
response to a $1,000 dollar change in UNEXPROFIT.
13Additional statistics may be obtained from the authors upon request.
14Under either of these conditions, the dollar proﬁts distributed to shareholders will increase. The
rate of return to stockholders may or may not be affected, depending on the inﬂuence of these
variables on costs.
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